What schools don't teach..


.


Cosa dovremmo imparare a scuola? Solo nozioni, formule e descrizioni?
L'informatica "insegna" a pensare, a creare, a costruire.. ad usare la fantasia. Non serve ricordare centinaia di pagine ma basta pensare e inventare.. e la strada del successo diventa tutta in discesa!

Segnali e cause


.

"It turns out that people who use Firefox are more likely to engage in certain online activities than those that use IE. And it turns out that people who eat before bed are believed to gain more weight than those that don't. Perhaps using Firefox makes you a different sort of surfer, or the timing of the calories has something to do with your metabilism. More likely: the sort of person who takes the time to install a new browser is precisely the kind of person willing to use a new web service. The kind of person who makes a habit out of eating when bored (just before bed) might very well be the kind of person that has to wrestle with weight.

We see the same thing in outbound marketing. Spammers in Nigeria continue to use poorly written, ridiculous pitches. Not because they cause people to give up their senses and send tens of thousands of dollars, but because the kind of person that falls for something so dumb is probably the kind of person who is also going to be easily scammed. [...] A fever might be the symptom of a disease, but artificially lowering the fever (ice bath, anyone?) isn't going to do anything at all to change the illness.

Before changing the signal and thus assuming that this will change the outlook, it probably makes sense to understand what will change the causes of someone's perception and habits, and use the signal as a way of figuring out who needs to be taught."
Tratto da  Seth's blog

Molto interessante e molto attuale, specialmente in tempo di elezioni.

This is.. real!


.



Amazing. And real. Viviamo davvero in un mondo fantastico.



Blue-eyed Monks


.

Problem 
There is an island inhabited by monks who are very intelligent but have some very rigid rules that they live by.  For one, they believe that blue eyes are evil and if a monk finds out she has blue eyes she must kill herself *that very day*.  Another rule is that, despite everyone seeing each other every day, they cannot communicate in any way whatsoever. That, combined with the fact that there are no reflective surfaces on the island, means that the blue-eyed monks never find out their eye color and so all is good for years and years.  But one day a visitor comes to the island and before they leave, remarks for all to hear that they've never seen such beautiful blue eyes as on this island.

Assumptions
  • Every monk sees every other monk all the time
  • It is common knowledge on the island that all monks are rational and obey all monk protocols perfectly
  • Monks reason instantly and if one concludes that she has blue eyes she will commit suicide by sunset of that day
  • The visitor's announcement is made publicly
  • The visitor adds nothing but that observation (that there exist blue eyes on the island)

What happens? 

******************************************

Conjecture
If there are n blue-eyed monks on the island, they will all commit suicide on the nth day.  

Proof 
By induction on n.
Base Case: If there is only 1 blue-eyed monk, the visitor's announcement will prompt that monk's suicide the same day, day 1.
General Case: Assume that with n blue-eyed monks on the island, they will each commit suicide on day n.  Prove that with n+1 monks on the island, they will each die on day n+1.  This is true because if there are n+1 blue-eyed monks then each of them will *observe* n blue-eyed monks. Thus, by the induction hypothesis, they will expect (hope) that the n monks they observe will all commit suicide on day n.  When this doesn't happen, the only explanation can be that there are *not* in fact n blue-eyed monks.  There must be an additional, unseen, pair of blue eyes -- their own.  All following identical reasoning, they each realize their fateful eye color at the end of the nth day, and on day n+1 they each commit suicide. 

Example 
Suppose there are 2 blue-eyed monks on the island and you're one of them. Before the visitor arrives you always assume that the blue-eyed monk you observe is the only monk with blue eyes -- ie, you're safe.  (That monk is of course thinking the same thing about you). When the visitor announces that there are blue eyes on the island you expect the *one* (so you think) blue-eyed monk to commit suicide. When they don't, you realize you're in trouble.  They must have been watching someone else and waiting for that person to commit suicide.  
The only person that they could have been watching is you -- you can see that everyone else on the island has brown eyes so that rules them out.  So because the other blue-eyed monk didn't kill herself on day 1, you deduce on day 2 that your eyes are blue and you kill yourself.  The other monk went through identical reasoning watching you and so will also commit suicide on day 2.  Supposing there are 3 blue-eyed monks, each is watching the other 2 and expecting, by the reasoning above, that they will both die on day 2.  When they don't, she concludes that they must not be watching just each other.  Since it's symmetric, the other 2 monks are each watching you and the other one and thinking the same thing.  Hence, you all 3 know to kill yourselves by the 3rd day.  etc... 
It's clear that the visitor was necessary in the proof in order to establish the base case.  However, the only information that the visitor provides (there exist blue eyes on this island) is something that (assuming more than 1 blue-eyed monk) every single monk already knew.  

Question 
What was different after the visitor's announcement? Ie, as a monk on the island, what do you know after the visitor's announcement that you didn't know before?

Taken from: Daniel Reeves

Never trust women


.


Fantastico. Lei è fantastica.. Never trust women.

Questo è un classico esempio di "Game Theory". La scelta di ognuno dipende dal comportamento degli altri, e si finisce in gabbia. Una via d'uscita è la fiducia, ma non sempre funziona (vedi sopra..!).

Cosa farei io?
Lascerei parlare lei, poi direi: "Io non mi fido di te. Io scelgo "steal", indipendentemente da quello che dirai o farai tu. Ora, se anche tu scegli "steal" perdiamo entrambi; se invece scegli "split" io vinco e tu non ottieni nulla. Ma siccome mi hai fatto vincere, posso darti una parte della vincita. Diciamo 25.000 dollari."

Ovviamente rischierei, ma di certo preferisco avere la situazione in mano e rischiare, piuttosto che lasciare tutto nelle mani dell'altro e dipendere totalmente dalle sue decisioni. Lei non avrebbe scampo: scegliere "steal" sarebbe inutile, tanto vale arrendersi a "split" e sperare che io sia clemente. Questa strategia si chiama "contratto", e di fatto si tratta proprio di un accordo: la ragazza potrebbe accettare la proposta e magari negoziare la sua quota..

Propaganda (in)utile


.

Poco fa mi arriva questa simpatica mail:

"Gentili tutt@,
trasmetto il mio materiale elettorale .
Scusandomi per l'intrusione porgo cordiali saluti.

Informativa ai sensi dell’art 13 del D.Lgs 196/2003
I dati da Lei forniti liberamente, raccolti in manifestazioni pubbliche oppure estratti da elenchi pubblici sono utilizzati da [...] solo ed esclusivamente ai fini di propaganda elettorale del candidato e non saranno comunicati a terzi. Lei ha diritto, in qualunque momento, di accedere ai dati, ottenere di non ricevere più materiale di propaganda, opporsi al trattamento dei dati o chiedere di integrarli,rettificarli, aggiornarli  inviando una e-mail [...]"

Ovviamente il mettente è un "politico" a me sconosciuto, a cui non ho mai dato la mia mail e che ha pensato di fare un po' di propaganda in vista delle elezioni. Probabilmente il mio indirizzo l'ha preso da qualche mia adesione online a scuole/corsi/newsletter o simili, quindi non posso biasimarlo (anche se in realtà non penso di aver mai autorizzato l'utilizzo "pubblico" della mia mail), in ogni caso leggo volentieri gli allegati perché può essere utile ad approfondire la mia conoscenza dei candidati.

Ebbene apro i due file pdf e trovo una lettera di poche righe, che in sostanza dice "votatemi", e un volantino che rappresenta come votarlo e dove scrivere il suo cognome. Nulla di più, non una parola su chi è e cosa vuole fare di bello per noi, non un riferimento ai temi dei quali si vuole occupare, alle sue competenze e alle sue proposte. 

Allora rispondo alla mail:

"Buongiorno
Grazie per la comunicazione (anche se in realtà non l’ho mai chiesta, comunque mi piace dare uno sguardo a tutto)
 
Mi permetto solo di dirle che da un candidato politico io generalmente mi aspetto CV, futuro programma politico dettagliato (personale) e breve riepilogo dell’attività (politica e sociale) svolta finora. Poi penserò io a come votare e cosa scrivere sulla scheda.
 
Vedo che sul suo sito parte del materiale è disponibile, ma credo manchi un programma personale (almeno una dichiarazione di intenti). Anche perché se ci si affidasse solo al programma dei “grandi partiti”, allora non ci sarebbe differenza tra un candidato e l’altro.
 
Mi scusi l’intrusione"

Beh mi sembra il minimo, no? 
Poco dopo replica ringraziandomi per l'osservazione, ma dimenticandosi di allegare CV, programma e riassunto dell'attività svolta finora. Una svista?
 

Nash's idea?


.

[...] Mr. Nash's contribution was far more important than the somewhat contrived analysis about whether or not to approach the most beautiful woman in the bar. What he discovered was a way to predict the outcome of virtually any kind of strategic interaction. Today, the idea of a ''Nash equilibrium'' is a central concept in game theory.

Modern game theory was developed by the great mathematician John von Neumann in the mid-1940's. His goal was to understand the general logic of strategic interaction, from military battles to price wars. Von Neumann, working with the economist Oscar Morgenstern, established a general way to represent games mathematically and offered a systematic treatment of games in which the players' interests were diametrically opposed. Games of this sort -- zero-sum games -- are common in sporting events and parlor games.

But most games of interest to economists are non-zero sum. When one person engages in voluntary trade with another, both are typically made better off. Although von Neumann and Morgenstern tried to analyze games of this sort, their analysis was not as satisfactory as that of the zero-sum games. Furthermore, the tools they used to analyze these two classes of games were completely different. Mr. Nash came up with a much better way to look at non-zero-sum games. His method also had the advantage that it was equivalent to the von Neumann-Morgenstern analysis if the game happened to be zero sum.

What Mr. Nash recognized was that in any sort of strategic interaction, the best choice for any single player depends critically on his beliefs about what the other players might do. Mr. Nash proposed that we look for outcomes in which each player is making an optimal choice, given the choices the other players are making. This is what is now known as a Nash equilibrium. At a Nash equilibrium, it is reasonable for each player to believe that all other players are playing optimally - since these beliefs are actually confirmed by the choices each player makes. 

It's a nice theory. But is it true? Does it describe actual behavior in actual games? Well, no. Game theory is an idealization: it analyzes how ''fully rational'' players should play if they all know they are playing against other fully rational players. That assumption of ''full rationality'' is the problem with game theory. In real life, most people - even economists - are not fully rational.

Consider a simple example: several players are each asked to pick a number ranging from zero to 100. The player who comes closest to the number that is half the average of what everyone else says wins a prize. Before you read further, think about what number you would choose. Now consider the game theorist's analysis. If everyone is equally rational, everyone should pick the same number. But there is only one number that is equal to half of itself: zero. This analysis is logical, but it isn't a good description of how real people behave when they play this game: almost no one chooses zero. 

But it's not as if the Nash equilibrium never works. Sometimes it works quite well. Two economists, Jacob Goeree and Charles Holt, recently published a clever article, ''Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions,'' that exhibits a number of games in which the Nash theory works well, and then show that what should be an inconsequential change to the payoffs can result in a large change in behavior. In their simplest example, two players, whom we will call Jacob and Charles, independently and simultaneously choose an amount from 180 cents to 300 cents. Both players are paid the lower of the two amounts, and some amount R (greater than 1) is transferred from the player who chooses the larger amount to the player who chooses the smaller one. If they both pick the same number, they both are paid that amount, but no transfer is made. So if Jacob chooses 200 and Charles chooses 220, the payoff to Jacob is 200+R and the payoff to Charles is 200-R. If Jacob thinks Charles will say 200, then Jacob will want to announce 199. But if Charles thinks Jacob will announce 199, then Charles should say 198. And so on. The only consistent pair of beliefs is when each thinks the other will say 180. When Mr. Goeree and Mr. Holt performed this experiment with R=180, nearly 80 percent of the subjects picked 180, which is the Nash prediction. When they set R=5, and reran the experiment (with different subjects), however, the outcomes were completely reversed, with nearly 80 percent choosing 300.

Findings of this sort have stimulated the development of ''behavioral game theory'', which tries to formulate a theory of how to understand games involving real people, rather than those mythical ''fully rational'' people. Consider, for example, the ''guess half the average'' game described earlier. Oscar, a simpleminded player, might think that any number between zero and 100 is equally likely, so he would guess 50. Emmy, who is more sophisticated, might figure that if lots of people were like Oscar and say 50, then she should say 25. Tony, who is yet more sophisticated, figures that if lots of people think like Emmy, then he should say 12 or 13. And so on. An economist named Rosmarie Nagel ran a game like this a few years ago and found that the choices do tend to cluster around 50, 25 and 12. In fact, the winning choice turned out to be close to 13, a number chosen by about 30 percent of the players. In this game the best strategy wasn't the Nash equilibrium, but it wasn't so far away from it either.

Back to picking up women. In the movie, the fictional John Nash described a strategy for his male drinking buddies, but didn't look at the game from the woman's perspective, a mistake no game theorist would ever make. A female economist I know once told me that when men tried to pick her up, the first question she asked was: ''Are you a turkey?'' She usually got one of three answers: ''Yes,'' ''No,'' and ''Gobble-gobble.'' She said the last group was the most interesting by far. Go figure.

Thansk to H. R. Varian